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SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS Part III
 SCIENTIFIC EPISTEMOLOGY? 
David Tin Win α & Thandee Kywe β 
Abstract  
 The major factor that limits 
application of science in episte-mology 
is identified as the blindness of science 
to the mind side of humans. The 
argument is develop-ed through three 
issues: Knowledge v. Belief; 
Rationalism v. Empiricism and 
Skepticism v. Certainty, which form the 
three major arguments of epistemology. 
Plato’s view and The Justified True 
Belief theory on knowledge and belief; 
Rene Descartes’ defense of rationalism 
and John Locke’s defense of empiricism 
in rationalism v. empiricism; and G. E. 
Moore’s    defense   of   certainty,    called 
“Defense of Common Sense” and 
David Hume’s defense of skepticism 
in skepticism v. certainty are examined. 
1.INTRODUCTION
This is the third of a series of four
papers, which contend that science is 
incapable of resolving arguments in 
metaphysics. Science has generally 
ignored the mind aspect and 
concentrated on the material aspect of 
things, including humans. This limits 
application of science to metaphysics. 
The limitation of science in 
epistemology is examined in this paper. 
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Epistemology is the philosophical 
study of knowledge. The following 
three issues that form the set of major 
arguments, Knowledge v. Belief; 
Rationalism v. Empiricism and 
Skepticism v. Certainty, are considered. 
Plato’s view that knowledge and 
belief are different and The Justified 
True Belief theory that knowledge is 
belief under certain circumstances are 
the two views on the first issue, 
knowledge v. belief. 
Rene Descartes’ defense of 
rationalism and John Locke’s defense 
of empiricism are the two views on the 
second issue, rationalism v. empiricism. 
G. E. Moore’s defense of certainty, 
called “Defense of Common Sense” and 
David Hume’s defense of skepticism 
are the two views on the third issue, 
skepticism v. certainty. Can science 
contribute to the resolution of these 
issues? 
2. VIEWS EXAMINED
(a) Plato’s view that knowledge and 
belief is different from each other.
His argument consists of the 
following steps: 
(i) Knowledge and belief are mind
faculties.
(ii) Mind faculties are distinguished
by their particular objects
(iii) Knowledge   object   is   certain
truth, and unchangeable.
(iv) Belief object is contingent truth,
and changeable.
(v) Thus, knowledge and belief is
not the same thing.
“I know X,” means I am certain 
about X. “I believe X,” does not mean 
that I am certain about X. Plato (427-
347 B.C.)1, Republic Book V, 477 says 
“that which entirely is, is entirely 
knowable, and that which in no way is is 
in every way unknowable”. This shows 
that what is true can be known, but what 
is not true cannot be known ie. the 
object of knowledge is unchangeable 
certain truth.   
“I know I am a man, but I am not 
sure.” is an odd statement, but “I 
believe it will rain this afternoon, but I 
am not sure.” is not an odd statement. 
The difference between belief and 
knowledge is based on how certain the 
claim is.  
Plato was thinking in a similar 
way. However, he argues that if a thing 
is “both is and is not, that sort of thing 
would lie between that which purely and 
absolutely is and that which wholly is 
not, and that the faculty correlated with 
it would be neither science nor 
nescience, but that which should appear 
to hold a place correspondingly 
between nescience and science”. Then 
he concluded  “And now there has 
turned up between these two the thing 
that we call opinion”. With this he 
pointed out that “opinion” lies between 
knowledge (science) and belief 
(nescience). 
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Plato says certainty, or lack of 
certainty, is in the knowledge object, 
not in the knower: “X is certain.” (X is 
true in itself) and not “I’m certain that 
X,” (not X is true because I am sure). In 
other words, X must be true, 
unchangeably. 
“What is certain truth?” is a first 
criticism to Plato’s argument. Any 
matter of fact can have arguments 
against it, or every matter of fact may 
be contradicted. This means matter of 
fact is never certain. 
Another criticism is that language 
is not precise. For example, “I believe I 
am a man,” means I am not certain that 
I am a man. “I know that answer…I 
think,” means I know, but what I know 
may not be true.   
A third problem is the question 
concerning certainty. Is it a 
psychological state?  as in “I am 
certain,” (I know it is true in my mind); 
or a metaphysical state? as in “It is 
certain” (known from other causes – 
like knowing by instinct). These 
problems do not prove Plato’s argument 
to be faulty, but they show the need for 
careful thought on the nature of 
certainty. 
Knowledge and belief are mental 
functions. The former is based on the 
“consciousness series” of mind 
activity, mentioned in the first paper of 
the series: Science and Metaphysics 
Part  I,  Scientific  Art  Appreciation – 
Is It Possible? Science does not 
recognize the mind aspect of an entity. 
Hence science cannot contribute here. 
(b) The Justified True Belief (JTB)
theory. A widely accepted theory, says
that somebody (S) knows a proposition
(P) to be true, if and only if
(1) S believes P
(2) S is justified in believing P, and
(3) P is true.
An alternative example based on 
the one given in the lesson can be: 
(i) I believed he was going to arrive
by Northwest flight today. (ii) I was 
justified in believing this since he had 
called me, and there was a NW flight 
today. (iii) It is true that he came. 
There are several possible 
objections to this view, things like 
1. What is justification?
2. What is truth?
3. Plato’s   distinction  between
certainty of knowledge and
uncertainty of belief?
However all of these objections 
cannot disprove JTB - the possibility 
that the JTB theory is true still exists as 
long as its three propositions are true. 
Many accept its truth, but disagree 
about its meaning. 
Edmund Gettier’s criticism has a 
different base. He says that even if all 
three conditions of the JTB theory are 
present, knowledge may not be there. 
He uses fundamental logic principles 
that all proponents, who support the 
JTB theory, will accept. With this he 
ABAC Journal Vol. 23, No.2 (May - August, 2003), pp. 21 - 29 23 
David Tin Win & Thandee Kywe 
showed faults in above and also in the 
Chisholm and Ayer arguments- Edmund 
L.Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief
Knowledge?”
2
The first principle is that if “X and 
Y” is true, then “Y” is true, or if both 
parts are true, then each part is true. An 
alternative example to the one given 
can be: if it is true that Felix is a cat and 
Felix is a Siamese cat, then it is true 
that Felix is a Siamese cat, and it is also 
true that Felix is a cat.  
The second principle is that if “X” 
is true, then “X or Y” is true (if “X” is 
true, then only one, either X or Y is 
true). For example, if it is true that Felix 
is a Siamese cat, then it is true that 
“Felix is a Siamese cat or Felix is a 
collie”; “Felix is a Siamese cat or Felix 
is a dog”; “Felix is a Siamese cat or the 
earth is flat.” 
The first principle was shown using 
Smith’s belief that the man with 10 
coins in his pocket will get the job.  
(1) Smith believes P: “The man
who gets the job will have 10 coins in 
his pocket.” 
(2) Smith’s belief in P was
justified, because he knew the job was 
offered to Jones, who had 10 coins in 
his pocket 
(3) Hence P is true.
But Smith got the job instead of 
Jones, and then he discovered that he 
also had 10 coins in his pocket. Thus 
Smith was completely surprised. So he 
met all three conditions of the JTB 
theory but he did not have knowledge. 
The second principle was shown 
using, Smith’s belief that “Jones owns a 
Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.” 
Smith’s belief about Jones owning a 
Ford is justified (X true). But Smith 
does not really know where Brown is 
(X true, Y false). This demonstrates that 
X is true and Y is false because X is 
true. Then he finds out that Jones does 
not own a Ford but that Brown is really 
in Barcelona (X false, Y true). This 
demonstrates X is false and Y is true 
because Y is true. 
(1) Smith believes P: “Jones
owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.” 
(2) Smith was justified in
believing P, because he knew Jones 
own a Ford. 
(3) P is true.
Smith was completely surprised. 
Even though all three conditions of the 
JTB theory were met, Smith did not 
have knowledge. Thus under certain 
circumstances, knowledge (certain) can 
be belief  (uncertain). 
The major objection to Gettier: was 
Smith really justified in believing “The 
man who gets the job will have 10 coins 
in his pocket” when he was wrong 
about Jones getting the job. Also was he 
justified in believing “Jones owns a 
Ford or Brown is in Barcelona” when 
he was wrong about Jones owning a 
Ford? 
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Here again, belief being a mental 
property precludes science. 
(c) Rene Descartes’ defense of
rationalism. His argument is as
follows:
(i) I know a priori that I exist
(Cogito), so some knowledge is a priori 
(ii) Thus even “experiential”
knowledge is a priori. 
(iii) Hence, all knowledge is a
priori. 
The second premise is based on 
Descartes’ example of the piece of wax. 
The properties of wax are changed 
when it melts; yet is known that the 
wax melt is the same as the solid wax. 
For this to be possible, a priori 
knowledge, before sense experience, 
must exist. The knowledge that the wax 
melt and the solid wax are the same 
must exist before hand, before 
observing the wax melt. Thus 
knowledge not based on experience, 
before experiencing, technically called 
a priori knowledge exists. “since all the 
reasons which contribute to the 
knowledge of the wax, or any other 
body whatever, are yet better proofs of 
the nature of my mind!  And there are 
so many other things in the mind itself 
which may contribute to the elucidation 
of its nature, that those which depend 
on body such as these just mentioned, 
hardly  merit  being  taken  into 
account”- Rene Descartes (1596-1650), 
Meditations on a First Philosophy. 3 
This passage demonstrates Descartes 
subscribes to the a priori concept. 
But Descartes knowledge of the 
wax solid and melt being the same 
might have come from being shown 
before. He might have learned this fact 
before - he might have learned it after 
an experience - a posteriori. Therefore 
Descartes second premise weakens his 
argument. 
a priori knowledge involves 
memory, a mind function. Thus science 
is not applicable.  
(d) John Locke’s Empiricism. The
basic argument is the belief that we are
born “blank slates”. We are born
without innate ideas in our minds or
brains. Our minds are totally blank. We
begin to acquire ideas when we start
using our senses, just like writing on a
“blank slate”. “All ideas come from
Sensation or Reflection” - John Locke
(1632-1704), An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding4. 
Locke’s argument against 
rationalism is: (i) Rationalism assumes 
innate ideas. (ii) Innate ideas do not 
exist   (iii) Hence, rationalism fails. 
Support for Locke’s second 
premise is as follows: there will be 
proof if innate ideas exist. Proof can be 
from young children, whose ideas 
cannot have come from experience, and 
thus cannot be empirical; and from 
universal agreement about certain facts 
or truths. Lack of such proof shows 
innate ideas do not exist.  
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Locke’s position was criticized on 
two fronts [Please see comments 
section also] 
(i) failure to find proof does not
mean there is no proof to be found. In 
other words, just because proof is not 
available, we cannot say it is not 
present. For example, in the days when 
x-ray machines were not present, the
presence of x-rays cannot be detected.
This did not mean x-rays did not exist.
X-rays actually existed, even though
there was no proof of their existence.
Also if it is said that no innate ideas
exist because there is no proof of their
existence, then the “Fallacy of Appeal
to Ignorance” is committed.
(ii) Since Locke says innate ideas
can be known only through experience 
(empiricism), he was trying to prove 
empiricism by using empiricism. Thus 
his argument is circular. 
There is also a problem with the 
first premise of rationalism assuming 
innate ideas. The term “innate” is 
ambiguous. It can mean “born in,” so it 
need not be present at birth, it may have 
already been there before birth. Or it 
can mean “born with,” meaning it is 
present starting from the time of birth. 
Locke probably refers to the second 
meaning, whereas rationalists refer to 
the first. So Locke’s first premise is too 
ambiguous, and it weakens his attempt 
to disprove rationalism. 
There are two arguments used by 
Locke to affirm or support empiricism: 
(i) existence of a posteriori (empirical)
knowledge; and (ii) empirical
knowledge is a natural phenomenon.
The first argument goes like this: I 
know that I exist. I know this by either 
a priori or a posteriori. But no 
knowledge is a priori. Therefore, there 
is a posteriori (empirical) knowledge 
based on experience. 
The second argument is that nature 
does nothing without a purpose. Nature 
lets one get ideas through the five 
senses. Knowledge is made up of these 
ideas. Therefore, knowledge comes via 
experience through the senses 
(empiricism), and empirical knowledge 
is therefore a natural phenomenon. 
The second premise of the first 
affirmative argument, shown above 
(“no knowledge is a priori”) is weak. 
With reference to the second 
affirmative argument: (i) Nature 
sometimes does not seem to have a 
purpose – for what purpose is excessive 
rain in flooded areas? (ii) The function 
of senses may not be just to get ideas – 
survival and reproduction functions are 
not ideas. (iii) Knowledge may consist 
of more than just ideas acquired a 
posteriori – instincts are examples. 
In short, Locke’s argument on 
rejection of rationalism can fail because 
(i) it commits a “fallacy of appeal to
ignorance”; (ii) it is circular (assuming
as premise that he wants to prove in his
conclusion); and (iii) it depends on an
ambiguous word “innate idea.”
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Locke’s first affirmative argument, 
second premise depends on his rejection 
of rationalism, which is not proven. 
Hence it may fail. Locke presumes too 
much about nature and the senses, so 
his second affirmative argument may 
fail too. 
Innate ideas are the focus of the 
arguments here. Hence it involves the 
mind and science is not valid. 
(e) David Hume’s defense of
skepticism.
“All the objects of human reason 
or enquiry may be naturally divided 
into two kinds, to wit, Relations of 
Ideas, and Matters of Fact.  Of the first 
kind are the sciences of Geometry, 
Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, 
every affirmation, which is either 
intuitively or demonstratively certain. 
That the square of the hypotenuse is 
equal to the square of the two sides, is a 
proposition, which expresses a relation 
between these figures.  That three times 
five is equal to the half of thirty, 
expresses a relation between these 
numbers.  Propositions of this kind are 
discoverable by the mere operation of 
thought, without dependence on what is 
any where existent in the universe”. 
“Matters of fact, which are the 
second objects of human reason, are 
not ascertained in the same manner; 
nor is our evidence of their truth, 
however great, of a like nature with the 
foregoing.  The contrary of every matter 
of fact is still possible;”  - David Hume 
(1711-1776), An Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding5. Thus there are 
two kinds of human enquiry: Relations 
of Ideas and Matters of Fact. 
 Hume’s basic argument for 
skepticism is the proposition that “The 
contrary of every matter of fact is still 
possible.” This premise allows the 
following argument: 
(i) Knowledge implies certainty.
(ii) The contrary of every matter of
fact is always possible. (The possibility 
of the sun not rising tomorrow exists, 
even though the probability of this 
happening is very small). 
(iii) This means matter of fact
cannot be fully certain. Hence matters 
of fact cannot be known. 
Hume, an empiricist, believes that 
all knowledge objects are sense 
impressions, or ideas “left over” from 
those impressions, or relations of those 
ideas. When knowledge of a matter of 
fact is claimed (E.g., when the cue ball 
hits the 8 ball, the 8 ball will move in a 
certain way) the claim is based on the 
relationship of cause and effect. E.g., 
the pool shot have been observed 
enough times so that there is confidence 
that the cue ball cause the 8 ball to 
move. But the relationship of cause and 
effect is not something that can be 
sensed (see, taste, smell, touch, or hear). 
The cue ball was seen to move. The 
cue ball touched the 8 ball. The 8 ball 
movement was seen. But no cause was 
observed. Also there is a logical 
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possibility that next time the 8 ball will 
not move or that it will disappear. The 
claim to knowledge is thus not based on 
any certainty concerning cause and 
effect. It is based on the habit or custom 
that have been observed many times 
before (the two billiard balls act the 
way they do). Custom does not mean 
certainty. 
Human reason or enquiry, 
Relations of Ideas, and Matters of 
Fact are related to mind functions. 
Hence science is not capable here. 
(f) G. E. Moore (1873-1958),  “A
Defence of Common Sense”6. His
argument: (i) I have a body that
occupies a space, here on earth (contact
with other three-dimensional things and
other living human bodies has been
experienced) (ii) I am a human being
(has many different experiences of
many different kinds in many ways).
(iii) Each of us has known what I claim
to know.
Moore did not prove these 
premises further. He took them for 
granted. Then he introduced his 
challenge: If a person disagrees with 
Moore, then that person believes that 
his view is false, or believes that it 
could be false. In any case, this means 
that he has a belief. This belief could be 
true or false. Since he has this belief, he 
must exist as a human who has such a 
belief. Thus either way, Moore’s claim 
is proved. 
Moore’s argument seems difficult 
to disprove, but the following challenge 
may be made. Moore’s argument 
appears to be “I know I exist, therefore 
I have knowledge.” But how do I know 
I exist, if I need to prove the possible 
existence of the knowledge, I exist? 
Moore’s answer is that the very 
attempt to challenge him proves that he 
is correct. There is at least one human 
being—you. And you acknowledge his 
existing by challenging him. But then, 
the question “how do you know this?” 
arises. This is falling into a vicious, 
never ending circle. Thus Moore’s 
“Common Sense” view appears not to 
be so certain. 
Common Sense is definitely 
mental. Thus science that has ignored 
the mind cannot contribute here also. 
3. CONCLUSION
Knowledge in Plato’s view, belief
in JTB theory, in the knowledge v. 
belief issue; a priori knowledge in 
Descartes view, innate ideas in John 
Locke’s view, in the rationalism v. 
empiricism issue; human reason or 
enquiry, relations of Ideas, and matters 
of fact in Hume’s view and common 
sense in Moore’s view, in the 
skepticism v. certainty issue, are all 
mental functions or mind properties. 
Since science has ignored the mind 
aspect of entities, it is incapable of 
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contributing towards resolution of the 
various issues in epistemology. 
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